WORLD-1 SECURITY SPECIALISTS 1051 CANDACE LANE, LA HABRA, CA 90631

October 13, 2017

Dr. Pamela Magee
Executive Director
PCHS
15777 Bowdoin Street
Los Angeles, CA 90272

Dear Dr. Magee,

Attached is the World -One Security Specialists' (World-1) report covering our survey and assessment of the state of physical security and safety at PCHS. This report details our survey process, process management, and infrastructure and technology recommendations.

Tim Garrow, Bryan Tae, David Welp, Dave Ko, Joon Lee, and myself appreciate the opportunity to work with you and other administrators at PCHS throughout this important effort. Thank you again for giving us the opportunity to provide our services.

Sincerely,

Peter Straka
World-1 Security Specialists

PALISADES CHARTER HIGH SCHOOL
15777 BOWDOIN STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90272

SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OCTOBER 2017

Prepared by:

WORLD-1 SECURITY SPECIALISTS
1051 CANDACE LANE
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INTRODUCTION

In October 2017, World-One Security Specialists (World-1) was commissioned to conduct an assessment of the PCHS campus. The objective of the assessment was to identify the current state of security at the school, and subsequently develop recommendations for improvements that would aid PCHS in its safety improvements. Our goal is to help PCHS in reducing risks and enhancing campus safety. This report details the observations, findings, and recommendations of our professional security consultants.

The details contained in this report could place PCHS students, faculty, staff and facilities at some risk due to various security vulnerabilities being identified and reported. As such, it is our recommendation that this document be considered confidential as a precaution in the protection of persons and facilities.

Throughout the assessment process, we received excellent cooperation from PCHS Administration and staff members we interviewed. We believe these individuals were candid in sharing their opinions about the current state of campus security and safety, as well as identifying potential issues and concerns. Their cooperation was an important component in helping us to gain a comprehensive understanding of the current safety and security state.

INTRODUCTION-continued

A security assessment is a necessary first step in developing a comprehensive security plan.

Safety and security in our nation's schools continue to concern administrators, parents, teachers and students. The range of issues encompasses a wide spectrum of possible scenarios; the challenge to school administrators can appear overwhelming. A key tool in being adequately prepared is to complete a safety and security assessment.

In a school setting, a safety and security assessment examines many possible emergencies in which the safety or security of students or school personnel could be endangered. The assessment is a necessary first step in developing a comprehensive emergency response plan — encompassing both the scope of the emergency and the demographic/geographic extent of an institution.

The assessment should evaluate every safety and security situation in terms of:

Prevention and Mitigation: What steps should be taken before an emergency arises that could prevent or mitigate that emergency?

Preparedness: Are resources and personnel in place and trained for each possible situation?

Response: Has a detailed response been formulated for each scenario?

Recovery: What recovery steps will the institution take once the emergency is abated?

INTRODUCTION-continued:

The assessment also should uncover the need for agreements and communication channels between an institution and local government and law-enforcement agencies. Sustainable training for personnel must be analyzed and developed as part of the comprehensive plan; simply handing out a binder with procedures is inadequate without regular training and drills. Technology, equipment and student records, both existing and planned, should be cataloged and incorporated.

Although crime in schools has decreased significantly over the past decade (according to statistics from the National Center for Education Statistics), other potential emergencies may arise. For example, the advent of the H1N1 flu virus (swine flu), now defined as a pandemic, means the control of infectious disease assumes perhaps as much importance as controlling gang activity did 10+ years ago.

Education institutions that have never conducted a safety and security assessment should do so. Without a comprehensive assessment, there simply is no rational way to develop an emergency plan, budget for safety and security implementation (e.g., equipment, training, personnel), or ensure parents and staff that the school has a plan in place. Some districts or campuses may feel they have addressed safety and security adequately or even may have conducted an assessment. In these cases, they should periodically review their emergency plans to keep them current and refine/enhance; schools are not static environments, and emergency planning should be reviewed on an annual basis or whenever new concerns arise.

Assessments should be performed by individuals with professional qualifications in school security, and in cooperation with administrators, staff and other key constituents in the school community. Such individuals might include in-house security staff, a trained school resource officer from a local police agency, or an independent professional security consultant with school-specific security experience.

Could a school administrator conduct an assessment of his or her own school? A common-sense approach and an appropriate understanding of basic security principles could enable an administrator to perform an assessment. However, the outcome from a self-assessment likely will be more limited than if the assessment were done by a trained school security specialist. Checklists used in self-assessments may be prepared by individuals with inadequate school security experience or by individuals who are unfamiliar with the K-12 environment. Efforts to assess safety and security may be more credible (and perceived as such) if an experienced security professional is brought in.

INTRODUCTION-continued

Each school, district or campus will have its own distinct set of safety and security issues. Real differences exist among urban, suburban and rural districts, and the safety and security assessment of each should be tailored to the specific situation. But every institution should employ established safety and security standards against which the assessment is conducted. The most critical standards are those that address visibility within a building and on campus, control of entry points ,availability of emergency exit points, the ability to lock down a school facility, and emergency communication systems. The purpose of established standards is to anticipate safety and security issues, as opposed to merely reacting to the most recent emergency.

An assessment leads to policies that are followed during emergencies. It also can direct administrators to lower-level problem areas that are facility-related and, hence, correctable during construction or renovation. Several key areas typically arise as potential problems:

- Restrooms: Because students or visitors feel that the privacy of a restroom enables them to act undetected, restrooms are a frequent source of problems. Although video cameras are an unacceptable intrusion in a restroom, placement at restroom entrances in highly visible locations is recommended.
- After Hours Events: Activities in which students and public guests interact should be assessed. Schools hold various sporting events, programs and public meetings; how attendees enter and move through the school is paramount. Access to a facility should be limited only to those areas necessary for attendees of after- hour events.
- School Parking Lot: A large portion of people who enter a school site will do so via the parking lot. At high schools and colleges, many students arrive and leave by automobile as well; parking lots are a source of many lower-level safety issues. Traffic control, drop off points and visibility all are critical parking concerns that may be overlooked in a safety and security assessment.
- Peripheral Site Protection: Many non-intrusive fencing options are available. Video cameras may be an appropriate tool to monitor exterior areas as well.
- Routes: The daily route of students, staff and parents. Where does each person normally travel during the school day, and how can that route be as safe as possible? Some schools use forced entry points — requiring visitors to enter only at defined points. What kind of visibility exists at the forced entry points? Is there a system in place that admits and monitors visitors who enter there?

METHODOLOGY

The assessment process included a physical survey of the PCHS Campus. This included the perimeter, parking lots, the front of the school, tunnels, and other key areas across the campus. We also conducted a review of current security operations and current security technologies. We had discussions with administrators and staff, both during and after our physical survey of the campus. These discussions provided important information about the current security and technologies, as well as some areas of concern.

The survey and assessment was conducted by Tim Garrow, Peter Straka, David Welp, Bryan Tae, and Dave Ko. Our process consisted of interviews and visits to the PCHS campus. This included access to buildings, as well as discussions with the Administration, among other activities. Input was received from a section of staff with whom we had an opportunityto interact. In each instance, we found those with whom we had conversations to be direct, candid and genuinely interested in personal and property security at PCHS.

It is our belief that safety and security matters in an academic setting is a delicate balance of preparation, risk prevention, responses to potentially dangerous situations, and the effective use of campus facilities for day-to-day use. Therefore, a "complete systems" approach is necessary. This includes the implementation of security and safety technologies combined with appropriate policies and procedures, as well as the use of trained security personnel to the campus.

PCHS safety and security efforts need to be consistent with the risks inherent in all high school campus environments. In addition to this, PCHS has unique geographic and demographic characteristics that must be accounted for. The key to successful safety and security at PCHS is dependent upon strong perimeter security, a viable technology infrastructure, the deployment of professionally trained personnel, and the the support of administrators and school board members.

PROJECT SCOPE

World-1 developed the following Scope of Work assertion for completing a comprehensive assessment of PCHS security operations and infrastructure. This scope of work was implemented so that we may provide specific recommendations that meet industry standards and best practices, while taking into account the current identified gaps on the PCHS campus. Important components of this plan included significant survey coordination and review efforts.

Our work activities included:

- Reviewing current security infrastructure, including: Perimeter security/fencing, the existing camera system (CCTV), motion detection system, lighting, campus access points (entrances and exits), alarm system (intrusion system)
- Reviewing and analyzing vehicle traffic on and near campus, including: school buses, personal vehicles, public transportation, pedestrian ways, parking lots, foot traffic and student flow before/during/after school
- Reviewing existing security policies, procedures, and evacuation plans
- Determining the comparability of resources at similar high schools, to the extent of similarity of campus demographics
- Interviewing staff, and administrative personnel and conducting a survey of their perception of safety and areas of concern
- Interviewing a former law enforcement professional who has 20+ years experience as a campus police officer in Los Angeles
- Reviewing all physical security technologies
- Surveying the physical facilities on campus and neighborhoods adjacent to school

ADMONITION

Full implementation of the recommendations included in our assessment cannot fully guarantee that the PCHS campus or the surrounding areas will be crime-free or totally safe without risks. This report is meant to assist in reducing the potential for incidents by providing professional opinions and suggestions for enhancing the effectiveness of security resources by improving and further implementing security solutions and technologies. However, the security equipment we are suggesting is only one part of PCHS' complete security system. Additional components of the overall security strategy must include the application of effective policies and procedures, the awareness, training, and cooperation of staff, the selection, recruitment and retention of security staff, and emergency and crisis preparedness.

Our recommendations reflect our understanding of security issues at the time of our survey. We realize that security, safety, emergency management and crime prevention/reduction strategies are dynamic in nature. As campus functions and activities change or facility conditions are modified or expanded, some of the assumptions made during this review process will also change. As such, perimeter security, technology, and policies and procedures should be routinely reviewed and updated to reflect changes in the environment and the expectations of members of the PCHS community.

PCHS CAMPUS OVERVIEW

PCHS is a highly desirable public school in Southern California. This is reflected by an admissions waiting list with over 1,000 students, and that approximately 40% of the student body come to PCHS from more than 100 different Los Angeles zip codes. Geographically, the campus is bounded by Temescal Canyon Road to the east, Sunset Boulevard to the north, and El Medio Street to the west. It is uniquely bisected by Bowdoin Street, which runs between the stadium and the main campus area of the school.

PCHS academic buildings and layout are also unique in many ways. The campus is wide open and accessible from multiple directions on the west and south sides. With a public street bisecting the campus, it has a feel closer to that of a small junior college than a high school. The buildings are connected by a series of outdoor walkways, and with the exception of the "A" building, all classrooms are entered and exited from the exterior of the buildings. In addition to hosting classes on regular school days, the PCHS campus is also used for things such as a Sunday Farmer's Market, meetings, sporting events, and other activities that attract local citizens and others who otherwise may not be associated with the school. PCHS operates seven days a week when all sporting events, permits, and special events are taken into consideration.

We believe that PCHS students, staff, administration, and parents should not be hindered by unreasonable concerns about the public safety of self or property. PCHS is a unique place with communities composed of directed individuals challenged with study, learning, teaching, activities, and athletics. Therefore, it is important to recognize and consider such distinctiveness in developing meaningful recommendations relative to safety and security that will not interfere with any campus function.

RISKS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Risks were assessed through our observations, and our recommendations were made on the following pages. These pertain to the results of our survey in the following areas:

- CPTED
- Security Organization and Services
- LADWP Electrical Transformer
- Intrusion Detection Systems
- Security Video - CCTV Systems
- Electronic Access Control
- Perimeter Security
- Student Violence
- Emergency Preparedness
- Parking
- Cash Handling

CPTED

All of our recommendations are based on CPTED, or Crime Through Prevention Environmental Design:

CPTED principles are applied easily and inexpensively during building or remodeling projects, and have been implemented in communities across the nation. Designers and architects have always integrated resistance to natural threats — fire, earthquakes, floods, harsh weather—into their works. In recent years designers and architects have begun to recognize crime as a man-made hazard which can be resisted through quality design.

What is the secret to CPTED? It is the use of design to eliminate or reduce criminal behavior while at the same time encouraging people to "keep an eye out" for each other. These are just a few of the ingredients that go into creating an effective CPTED environment… that is, safer, more livable communities.

We encourage a wide selection of CPTED techniques and strategies as well as some traditional crime prevention methods. However, it cannot not replace the on site, professional CPTED survey. Evaluation of the site and the surrounding area is needed to properly survey a particular design.

II. CPTED STRATEGIES

CPTED design strategies have evolved over time. While many of the actual techniques have been in use for hundreds of years, it has only been in the last few decades that urban relationship between the built environment and criminal behavior. Each of the following CPTED strategies offer guidelines to improve the security at your campus.

Natural Surveillance

The placement of physical features, activities, and people in a way that maximizes visibility is one concept directed toward keeping intruders easily observable, and therefore less likely to commit criminal acts. Features that maximize the visibility of people, parking areas, and building entrances are: unobstructed doors and windows, pedestrian-friendly sidewalks and streets, front porches, and appropriate nighttime lighting.

CPTED

Territorial Reinforcement

Physical design can also create or extend a sphere of influence. Users are encouraged to develop a sense of territorial control while potential offenders, perceiving this control, are discouraged. This concept includes features that define property lines and distinguish private spaces from public spaces using landscape plantings, pavement designs, gateway treatments, signage, and open(“CPTED")fences.

Natural Access Control

Natural access control is another design concept directed primarily at decreasing crime opportunity by denying access to crime targets and creating a perception of risk for offenders. People are physically guided through a space by the strategic design of streets, sidewalks, building entrances, landscaping, and neighborhood gateways. Design elements are very useful tools to clearly indicate public routes and discourage access to private areas and structural elements.

Maintenance

Lastly, care and maintenance allow for the continued use of a space for its intended purpose. Deterioration and blight indicate less concern and control by the intended users of a site and indicate a greater tolerance of disorder. Proper maintenance prevents reduced visibility due to plant overgrowth and obstructed or inoperative lighting, while serving as an additional expression of territoriality and ownership. Inappropriate maintenance, such as over-pruning shrubs, can prevent landscape elements from achieving desired CPTED effects. Communication of design intent to maintenance staff is especially important for CPTED related ideas to be effective.

RISKS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EFFECTIVE SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES

As part of our assessment activities, we met with several key campus stakeholders to gather an understanding of the current security technologies installed on campus and the process for technology, planning, implementation, management and monitoring. The security technologies discussed included: Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Security Video (CCTV), Electronic Access Control (EAC) and Emergency Notification.

Our survey process included a review of the current security technologies installed and a discussion with both the Operations and IT Departments, who share in the management and maintenance of these systems. Although core technologies have been standardized for the most part, there is a lack of standards for their overall selection, implementation, and use. In some cases, the implementation of security technology is done on a program-by-program basis and is often based on a perceived need or available funding rather than being part of a coordinated, system-wide initiative. The IDS system, for example, has been disabled and not in use for a considerable amount of time although the system appears to function.

WHY SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES?

Security technologies are very effective in helping to improve school security problems. The security technologies we are recommending (e.g., cameras, sensors) are extremely beneficial tools if applied appropriately. They can provide school administrators or security officials with information that would not otherwise be available, free up man-power for more appropriate work, or be used to perform mundane tasks. Sometimes they can save a school money (compared to the long-term cost of personnel). Defining standards for the base technologies (manufacturer) is critical, and the campus for the most part has done so for the CCTV system software, and will need to be set for the future Electronic Access Control system.

RISKS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-continued

The following risks were observed during our physical survey of PCHS campus.

LADWP Electrical Transformer

The LADWP electrical transformer located on Temescal Canyon Rd. (near the corner of Sunset) is an area we found especially concerning. The transformer was erected in the middle of the sidewalk, only a few feet from the existing chain link fence that separates the PCHS Campus from thestreet. Below are factors that could potentially pose a threat to personal and property safety and security:

- In the event of heavy winds, earthquakes, etc. the chain link fence or tree branches could become energized with the transformer and create serious electrocution and fire risks
- The transformer itself is high-voltage overhead, and grounded by metal posts
- This high voltage transformer is not contained inside fencing and is somewhat accessible from the sidewalk
- There are no ceramic isolators installed in the fence directly adjacent to the transformer. We did find these isolators on the fence near a much smaller transformer on Sunset Blvd.
- There is no "high voltage" or "caution" signage anywhere

RECOMMENDATION

It is our professional recommendation that PCHS should consult with a high-voltage electrical specialist without delay. If this consultant agrees these risks are significant, steps need to be taken to mitigate the risks and improve safety.

RISKS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-continued

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

RISKS:

The campus has an installed IDS, yet the system is no longer on/utilized or monitored. An IDS is essential to manage and detect intrusions of security- sensitive areas after hours.

- The system needs to be re-commissioned, updated and programmed to report to an alarm monitoring service with sensor points mapped so the dispatcher can report the exact trigger location and can properly report to emergency contact personnel via a call tree. Additionally, the IDS is a supervisory tool for administration to include history reports, automated opening/closing reports, closing exception reports, etc., but none of these features are being utilized or appear to have been utilized.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Evaluate and re-commission the IDS system
- Add additional sensor points to include exterior motion sensors
- Define policies and processes for the IDS system after-hours use, arm/ disarm
- All perimeter fencing can be protected by using the Borderguard system, by Tattletale. This device will be installed inside of perimeter away from the fence.
- For swimming area, fencing area is same concept as mentioned as above.
- All buildings ideally monitored in the way of door contact, window sensor and motion detector

RISKS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-continued

Security Video - CCTV Systems

The implementation of security video, whether used actively or forensically, is increasingly seen across all types of organizations from higher education to healthcare to corporate, etc. It serves to augment the overall security program and in general support the protection of students, faculty, staff and property as a force multiplier, provides deterrence and is an investigative tool for criminal matters.

We did find a relatively significant implementation of cameras throughout the campus. Cameras appear to be modern stationary, mega-pixel cameras that are IP connected.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

We find that the use of security video within the higher education environment is growing exponentially. Although privacy concerns are real, it has been our experience that many of these issues are negligible if the application of video is well-thought-out, implemented using standards and governed by an acceptable use policy developed in close collaboration with the school's legal counsel and Police. Recorded images can perhaps be classified as sensitive information whose confidentiality, integrity and availability is protected. The policy should clearly outline formalized procedures for the installation of camera equipment and the handling, viewing, retention, dissemination, and destruction of video records, as well as training, and operator codes of conduct. We recommend that footage be reviewed on a weekly basis by campus security guards, who can subsequently notify administration of any suspicious activity. Regular reviews will allow PCHS to adequately address security issues-especially overnight and other times when the school is not in session.





RISKS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Electronic Access Control (EAC)

The campus does not have a system-wide Electronic Access Control and alarm monitoring system. Currently, the key control system does not include a frequent re-key program due to cost restraints. Therefore, it can be assumed, keys exist to the facility outside of the control of administration due to terminations, lost keys, copied keys, etc.

The initial phase of an implementation is to install card readers on doors used only by faculty and staff which will be monitored by the administration to include areas where there is cash handling, student and faculty records, and expensive musical, audio/video and computer system equipment. Other doors can be added during subsequent phases, and faculty and staff can be issued ID credentials through the same process as that for obtaining a physical key. As part of this initial implementation, no student typically will be issued access cards unless in the form of a Student ID.

Therefore, as the campus moves forward, it will be important to fully understand not only the design & initial implementation costs, but also any ongoing costs for future software and service and maintenance agreements and to appropriately plan and budget for this expense.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

An Electronic Access Control system should be implemented. Consideration should be given to expanding the system for use campus-wide by faculty, staff and students. Used in many secondary education environments as part of an institution-wide security solution, the EAC system can be used to manage and monitor doors to academic buildings using time schedules to lock and unlock, initiate lockdowns based on building or campus location and generally provide enhanced facility security. A possible integration with RFID badging of staff and students would permit a level of automation in ID provisioning and for facility and active directory access without excessive manual data entry. It is our view that faculty and staff should be equipped with RFID access cards, and should be required to scan these cards for entry into the parking lot and school buildings.

RISKS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-continued

Electronic Access Control

RECOMMENDATIONS-continued

Since the use of smart cards is part of an initial implementation, this dovetails suitably into implementing their use for other services such as cashless vending at cafeterias, checking out equipment, library materials or using copy machines, and access to sporting events, among many others. Smart card memory size, sector allocation and compatibility are all issues that will need to be explored however should this be considered.

Other useful integrations of the Electronic Access System may include:

- Intrusion detection systems to manage, operate and monitor these systems through one user interface,
- Security video to automatically associate alarm and video information to present to system operators.

RISKS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PERIMETER SECURITY ISSUES

- Existing Fencing
  - We found damage to the existing fence that runs on the West/El Medio, North/Sunset, and East/Temescal perimeter of the campus. This was especially glaring along Sunset Blvd. It's apparent the fencing is old and degrading.
  - There are ZERO gates along the fence on Sunset Blvd. In the case of an emergency or threat to the campus, students and staff should be able to exit campus in ANY direction. Push-bar exit only gates should be installed on all existing gates and newly installed gates.
  - Chain link makes it extremely easy to get a foot hold for climbing over

PERIMETER SECURITY ISSUES

- Lack of fence
  - PCHS is a very open campus on the south side (facing Bowdoin Street). Because Bowdoin St. is a public road, we believe that fencing should be installed to secure the entrance points--keep students in and others out.
  - Parking lots should be fenced off as well to prevent pedestrian traffic onto campus, both during school and after hours.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- If replacement of old/aged fencing is cost prohibitive, we recommend significant repairs to be completed on El Medio, Sunset, and Temescal Canyon fencing.
- Additional emergency exit gates should be implemented on the North/Sunset and East/Temescal sides of campus perimeter.
- Consideration should be given to installation of perimeter fencing that is more difficult to breach via climbing
- Effective access control requires that entry to and exit from a facility be regulated. A single point of entry allows for effective monitoring and control. Efforts to mitigate forced entry via the primary entrance are marginalized if secondary points of entry are not secure or easily defeated.
- Some buildings require multiple points of entry and/or have classrooms that open to the exterior. That is understandable; just realize that all perimeter points of entry must be regulated. For a point of entry to be regulated, no unauthorized person should pass through without drawing the attention of staff.
- If you cannot regulate all entrances, measures must be taken to regulate access at the campus level (extending the security perimeter) while ensuring each classroom operates with locked doors. Sites that cannot regulate access must be given priority when considering assignment of law enforcement or security personnel.

PEIMETER SECURITY ISSUES

RECOMMENDATIONS-continued

Construction of Fencing:

- In our opinion, it is imperative that PCHS erect fencing that will allow for the main campus area to be completely locked up overnight, on weekends, holidays, etc. This would require new fencing:
    - Across the front (flagpole area) of the school
    - Fencing off the parking lot (west of A Building) and the sidewalk/Bowdoin Street
- If BOTH proposed fences cannot be done immediately, we feel that the Parking Lot fence should be the main priority for security and safety on campus. This would ensure that visitors during the day are forced to a Single Point of Entry at the flagpole area which would be patrolled/controlled by security personnel.

RECOMMENDED SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY AT FLAGPOLE

PERIMETER SECURITY ISSUES

RECOMMENDATIONS (continued)

Use of a vestibule/double entry system

- Ideally, visitors would be granted access through a primary gated entrance then required to pass through the main office. The main office would allow visitors to enter a first entrance but the secondary entrance would remain secured without pre-screening and acceptance of the visitor.
- PCHS's campus cannot currently facilitate the use of a double entry system without major construction, therefore campus safety is required to be posted at the front entry area.

- Typically, in a high school, parking lots are an ongoing challenge for criminal activity. This includes acts of vandalism, breaking and entering of automobiles, drug dealing, fights, and criminal trespassing.
- Concerns exist with student congregation in the non-academic areas of the campus with simple "out-of-bounds" markings to separate authorized areas to include access to off campus. Students frequently congregate in areas easily accessible by the public, which is proximal to the public road. Campus safety makes an effort in this area but the current setup makes this extremely difficult to monitor.
- It is from this point that unknown person or persons have driven vehicles up onto the lawn, raised a ladder and gained access to the roof to commit acts of theft and vandalism. Staff reports finding cigarette butts and other paraphernalia suggesting that students frequently congregate in this area.

PERIMETER SECURITY ISSUES

- Physical Education Tunnel and Main Tunnel (to/from stadium)
  - Tunnels are currently wide open, not secure
  - Safety of students during school hours could be easily compromised

RECOMMENDATION

- Fencing should be installed around the exterior (street level) of the tunnel. On either side of Bowdoin St. it is currently very easy for students to walk or climb out (leave campus) and for unwanted persons to access students on campus.



RISKS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

STUDENT VIOLENCE

Most violence is typically student on student. On the rare occasion where violence is directed at a teacher or staff, it is usually secondary, meaning the teacher or staff were injured in the fight, but the anger was not intentionally directed at them. It was shared that there is no definitive training or information being given to faculty on how to properly respond to or intervene in fights. Other campus administrative representatives tell staff to stay out of fights, breaking up physical confrontations is the responsibility of the campus safety or police officer. Other campuses have informed faculty and staff that they have a legal responsibility to become involved when they see a physical altercation -they should do anything possible to break it up even at the risk of personal injury. Conflicting direction causes confusion among staff, and could very possibly lead to serious injury to a staff member.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A consistent standard for staff becoming involved in physical altercations should be developed. If staff members are going to be expected to step into physical altercations in an attempt to stop their aggression, staff should be provided with appropriate and ongoing training in techniques of aggression management, and in personal self-defense techniques.

Parking

All student and staff vehicles using campus parking areas are registered with PCHS. While one "sticker" for identification might be used on all campuses and a nominal annual fee is charged, posted notices of "restricted use" of spaces is utilized in controlling use of parking areas. The clear identification of vehicles is necessary for patrolling officers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that perimeter gates are automated utilizing the desired access control system for future implementation to facilitate proper off-hour, non-typical access control with reporting and/or front office control. We also recommend the installation of extra lighting in the main campus parking lots.

CONCLUSION/THANK YOU

As many institutions have learned, it is impossible to prevent all threats from occurring in a dynamic environment with a diverse population such as that of the PCHS campus. The recommendations above are offered by our consultants as a road map for documenting the current state of the physical security infrastructure, identifying behavioral and threat issues, and hopefully encouraging the participation of all who work/teach at PCHS in the process of implementing solutions to as many of our recommendations as possible.

We would like to thank all of the staff and administrators of PCHS who helped us complete our assessment. We look forward to the opportunity to further discuss our findings and recommendations with you.

Sincerely,

Peter Straka
World-1 Security Specialists